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Synthesis from Biology 
Mark V.  F i inn  ~ and Richard D .  A lexander  2 
INTRODUCTION 
This paper was invited as a discussion and critique of the preceding 
four papers. We have used it to take up the issue of whether the seemingly 
disparate approaches to culture theory from modern evolutionary biology 
can be reconciled and unified, and if so, how it can be done. Some of the 
differences, we think, exist chiefly in the minds of the investigators, perhaps 
as aspects of professional competition; some may arise from underlying 
ideological differences; and still others are apparently semantic. A few 
differences remain, however, that can be resolved only by showing that 
someone is wrong. 
All four papers are efforts to analyze the mechanisms of cultural 
transmission and change. This development is a logical next step in the 
progress toward understanding the meaning of recent advances in 
evolutionary biology for the problem of culture, and in the actual analysis 
of culture. It is appropriate that the initial question asked by this new wave 
of culture theorists was: Is culture "adaptive" in the new sense of that term 
from biology? We believe that the answer to this question has been 
established as affirmative in a sufficiently general sense to show that the 
new theories from biology are on the right course (e.g., Alexander, 1977, 
1979a; Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman, 1981; Chagnon, 1979, 1981; Daly and 
Wilson, 1978, 1981; Dickemann, 1979, 1981; Durham, 1976-1981; Flinn, 
1981; Hames, 1979; Irons, 1979a, 1979b, 1981; Lumsden and Wilson, 
1981). We hope that our comments here, while deliberately critical, will be 
recognized as part of the same general approach adopted by all of the 
authors represented in the four papers we are discussing, as well as those 
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listed above. The kinds of disagreements occurring now among biologists 
with regard to culture theory are not the sort that tend to cast doubt on the 
whole approach but, rather, are likely to produce new levels of accuracy 
and comprehension. 
We will argue here that the dichotomy of cultural vs. biological (or 
even cultural as distinct and independent of biological) evolution, tacitly or 
explicitly accepted in all four papers in this volume and by other proponents 
of what is usually called the coevolutionary perspective (e.g., Bonner, 1980; 
Cloak, 1975; Dawkins, 1976; Mundinger, 1980; Pulliam and Dunford, 
1980; Ruyle, 1973), is inappropriate and misleading. We believe that the 
culture-biology dichotomy derives from continued misunderstanding 
and misstatements of certain aspects of biological theory, namely: 
1. "Genetic determinism" is often falsely attributed to all so-called 
"natural selection models" of culture. Apparently this is done because 
natural selection as a cause is restricted to cases involving genetic variation, 
and insufficient attention is given to the cumulative effects of past selection 
in producing biases that determine directions of cultural change generation 
after generation in the absence of relevant genetic change. 
2. Cultural behaviors are inappropriately distinguished from other 
aspects of the phenotype on the basis of supposedly distinct and 
independent modes of transmission, usually stated as learned vs. genetic. In 
fact, the alternative to cultural behavior is not "genetically transmitted" 
behav, ior: the environment always participates in ontogenesis, even when it 
is invariable. Plasticity is the rule rather than the exception for all aspects 
of phenotypes, and imitation and other learning by observation are not 
restricted to human culture. 
3. Theories pertaining to the levels of natural selection (e.g., 
Williams, 1966; Lewontin, 1970; Alexander and Borgia, 1978) are 
frequently misinterpreted with respect to egoistic vs. apparently group- 
beneficial or altruistic behavior. In cases seemingly interpretable as evolved 
group-beneficial behavior several alternatives need to be eliminated, such as 
nepotism, reciprocity, and temporary commonality of interest. 
4. Theories of nepotistic (Hamilton, 1964) and reciprocal (Trivers, 
1971) altruism are frequently misinterpreted or neglected in refutations of 
biological analyses of culture. For example, it is sometimes forgotten that 
correlations of amounts and kinds of social interactions with genetic 
relatedness could have caused the evolution of (i.e., could be the evolved 
proximate mechanisms for) particular tendencies and biases in social 
learning, such as (a) assisting and (b) accepting the advice of close associates 
who, at least historically, are likely to be genetic relatives. 
We believe that the resolution of the cultural-biological dichotomy 
hinges on understanding the evolution of  social learning as the proximate 
mechanism of culture change. Because some of the above 
misunderstandings are at least partially rooted in historical traditions in 
social theory, we briefly review these traditions as they relate to models of 
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THE "SUPERORGANIC" AS F O R E R U N N E R  
OF C O E V O L U T I O N A R Y  VIEWS 
The social sciences have traditionally maintained the notion of  culture 
as a unique phenomenon,  above and beyond the organic world, possessing 
its own emergent properties (e.g., Kroeber, 1917; Parsons, 1954; Sahlins, 
1976b). White (1949: xviii) summarizes this position as follows: 
With the advance of science.., came a recognition of culture as a distinct class 
of events, as a distinct order of phenomena. It was seen that culture is not merely 
a reflex response to habitat, nor a simple and direct manifestation of "human 
nature." It came to be realized that culture is a continuum, a stream of events, 
that flows freely down through time from one generation to another and laterally 
from one race or habitat to another. One came eventually to understand that the 
determinants of culture lie within the stream of culture itself; that a language, 
custom, belief, tool or ceremony, is the product of antecedent and concomitant 
cultural elements and processes. In short, it was discovered that culture may 
be considered, from the standpoint of scientific analysis and interpretation, as a 
thing sui generis, as a class of events and processes that behaves in terms of its 
own principles and taws and which consequently can be explained only in terms 
of its own elements and processes. Culture may thus be considered as a self- 
contained, self-determined process; one that can be explained only in terms of itself. 
White's remarks have several implications, sometimes paralleled in modern 
coevolutionary theories. First, he is clearly attempting to separate the 
nature and mechanisms of  culture from its biological underpinnings. There 
are three possible reasons for doing this: (1) biology (as a science dealing 
with genetics, physiology, and behavior) had not offered satisfactory and 
general explanations (this was the case); (2) explanations from outside 
biology had developed which were clearly sufficient (this was not the case); 
or (3) it had been shown that biology had no possibility of  explaining 
culture (this also was not the case). I f  White had been writing more recently 
he might have followed the common but unsupportable and misleading 
practice of  contrasting the terms "cultural" and "biological," with the latter 
meant to be synonymous with "genetic." 
Second, White notes that the historical element in culture is so 
complex, and so important  in determining its subsequent possible 
directions, that to try to understand the structure of  culture in any place and 
time without taking its antecedents into account would be folly. While we 
agree, we also note that biologists have long recognized that this is true of  
all aspects to life: For each generation, organic evolution is restrained 
massively by its necessity of  beginning with the attributes of  the previous 
generation. 
Despite White's confident statement, no superorganic theory of  
culture (or any other!) has yet found general aceptance. Superorganic 
theories have fallen short in part because, although they may include clear 
statements of  the goals o f  cultural change, the mechanisms of  change are 
obscure. The structuralists in anthropology, for example, contend that 
social "solidarity" (Durkheim, 1938) is the desired outcome of  cultural 
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by which cultural traits might come to prevail because of their contribution 
to solidarity, however, are not specified (but see Irons, 1981). White's 
(1949, 1959) theory of cultural evolution toward increased efficiency of 
energy utilization is similarly vague concerning the particular mechanisms 
that would result in such change, and why these mechanisms should come to 
characterize culture. 
Specifying the mechanisms of cultural change, or the processes by 
which cultural traits are generated, saved, and lost, is a critical aspect of 
culture theory. Failure to specify such mechanisms has made superorganic 
theories difficult to test empirically. The lack of  testable predictions has led 
many superorganic theorists to seek nonfunctional explanations of culture 
in terms of arbitrarily assigned sets of meanings or symbolizations (Sahlins, 
1976b; Schneider, 1972) and to reject the possibility of a heuristic theory of 
culture. Indeed, this problem has led some culture theorists from within 
social anthropology to deny that culture can be reduced or dissected 
analytically at all. 
Two important arguments are traditionally mustered against the 
notion of culture as a nonfunctional superorganic process with no 
biological underpinnings: (1) Humans are, after all, biological organisms 
and devote considerable effort and time to satisfying biological 
requirements such as acquiring energy and mates and producing offspring. 
The importance of this fact for explaining cultural diversity is recognized, 
for example, in ethnographic analyses of technological adaptations to 
different environments. (2) There is no reason to doubt that the capabilities 
for cultural acquisition and retention are evolved capabilities; consequently 
culture must have been biologically adaptive throughout human evolutionary 
history or the capacity for culture would not have evolved. Recognition of 
these arguments led to renewed efforts by anthropologists in the last two 
decades to explain culture in terms of adaptation to the environment (e.g., 
Steward, 1955; Rappaport, 1968; Vayda, 1968; Harris, 1975; Winterhalder and 
Smith, 1981), an approach with significant influences on current 
coevolutionary theories of cultural change. 
ENVIRONMENTAL DETERMINISM AND ECOLOGICAL 
THEORIES OF CULTURE 
The materialist and cultural ecology paradigms in anthropology 
involve explanations of culture in terms of group or population-level 
adaptation to the environment. A central theme of this perspective is the 
notion that an important function of culture is to regulate population 
density in response to the availability of certain critical resources, such as 
protein (Harris, 1975; Rappaport, 1968)-i.e.,  to achieve and maintain 
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human populations at the "carrying capacity" of  the environment. A 
selective mechanism for this process of  group adaptation is proposed by 
Marvin Harris: 
As in the case of other adaptive evolutionary novelties, groups that invented 
or adopted growth cutoff institutions survived more consistently than those that 
blundered across the limits of carrying capacity (1974: 66). 
This "group-selection" rationale is similar to that accepted by biologists 
(e.g., see Wynne-Edwards,  1962) prior to Williams' (1966) critique. To 
account for any degree of  cultural complexity and diversity, however, 
Harris '  mechanism calls for frequent extinction of  human groups as a result 
o f  resource depletion. We are aware of  no evidence that this kind of  
extinction has ever occurred. The context in which differential group 
extinction and proliferation is easiest to visual ize-direct  intergroup 
competition and aggress ion- i s  for some reason avoided by most authors 
who invoke group selection, including Harris, and Richerson and Boyd (this 
volume). 
T H E  NEW C O E V O L U T I O N  
Largely in response to the so-called sociobiology debate, a number of  
authors have proposed that cultural evolution is an autonomous or 
separate adaptive process not leading to biological adaptation as such, but 
involving feedback between two separate kinds of  adaptation, cultural and 
biological. Mundinger (1980: 197) aptly summarizes this coevolutionary 
perspective, which with certain exceptions (see below) typifies the approach 
of  all of  the preceding four papers in this volume: 
Biological and cultural evolution are not the same process, nor is one an aspect 
of the other. They are independent mechanisms of change, and they explain 
change in fundamentally different forms of organized matter-life in one instance 
and culture in the other. Biological evolution describes and explains change in 
populations of organisms, and ultimately it explains change in the gene' pools of 
those organisms. Cultural evolution explains and describes change in the two 
populations associated with acquired, imitable behavior, that is, the overt [be- 
havioral] and covert [mental] populations that characterize culture. 
The primary reason why biological evolution is regarded by 
coevolutionary theorists as insufficient to explain culture seems to be the 
apparent independence of  cultural change from genetic change, in the sense 
that cultural traits are imitated and adopted by individuals in the absence of 
any immediate genetic change. Thus, Durham (this volume, p. 299) writes: 
The full explanation of human diversity requires attention to both biological 
and cultural processes. The sociobiology debate has served to emphasize that 
although the Darwinian process of natural selection has been the major architect of 
biological influences on human diversity it is clearly not the mechanism directly 
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responsible for molding the cultural influences. Cultural evolution can occur long 
before there appear changes in gene frequency in a population, and it must therefore 
be recognized as a distinct though interacting process. 
The transmission of cultural traits independently of the transmission 
of genes (the "dual inheritance" model of Richerson and Boyd, 1978; see 
also Cloak, 1975; Durham, 1979; Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman, 1981) is the 
linchpin of the coevolutionary rationalization for discriminating between 
cultural and biological evolution. Whereas cultural traits are transmitted by 
imitation and instruction, biological traits are said to be transmitted by 
genes. Natural selection is tacitly or explicitly rejected as a guiding force in 
cultural evolution on the argument that it accounts only for the differential 
transmission of genes. 
We believe that this way of  addressing the question of how culture 
changes, and how it assumes its overall forms and diversity, draws its 
proponents into confusing language and false dichotomies. First, biological 
traits are not transmitted by genes but by integrity in both the genes and the 
environment. It is axiomatic that in reproduction only genes and a little 
cytoplasm are transmitted directly. The new phenotype develops in response 
to both its genetic background and the particular environment in which it 
finds itself, and this development may include imitating behavior and other 
kinds of social learning on a large scale in a very wide variety of organisms. 
If the environment does not repeat itself the phenotype will not do so either, 
even in organisms without a hint of  culture. Thus, all phenotypic traits, not 
just cultural traits, are transmitted indirectly. 
Second, Durham asserts that natural selection is "clearly not the 
mechanism directly responsible for molding the cultural influences on 
human diversity" (emphasis added). The implications are that (1) natural 
selection is somehow responsible (indirectly?) for shaping culture and (2) 
its influence on culture is somehow less direct than its influence on 
noncultural attributes, or is qualitatively different. 
It is essential to clarify this point, not only for the question of culture 
theory but to put to rest some common criticisms against the approach of 
modern evolutionary biology. These criticisms are most often leveled against 
sociobiology and its supposed genetic determinism, where they occasional- 
ly have had some merit (cf., Alexander, 1979b); but they are in- 
appropriately directed against the main body of evolutionary biologists, 
or all who are concerned with the adaptive significance of traits. (Anyone 
who accepts the critical account of Gould and Lewontin, 1979, as typifying 
evolutionary biology will disagree. Gould and Lewontin, however, seem to 
be objecting mainly to the concept of optimality in separate traits. In 
general we agree with their caveats on this issue. As with Sahlins (1976a), 
however, they adopt the strategy of  selecting the worst papers they can find 
and contending that their faults are typical, rather than the more usual 
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scientific procedure of  building by correcting the faults of what they regard 
as the best or most nearly correct works. Thus, they devote more space to a 
minor field experiment, repeated unsuccessfully by other investigators and 
already criticized by both Gould and other evolutionary biologists, than to 
any other example. Anyone who depends on their paper as a description of 
modern evolutionary biology will have a strange and narrow view of the 
discipline.) 
Natural selection does two things, and only the first of these is 
explicitly acknowledged by most coevolutionary theorists as part of a 
natural-selection model of culture. This first effect of selection is that it 
sorts among genetic variations, causing some to spread and others to 
disappear. Apparently, what Durham means by "not directly responsible" is 
that most cultural variations are not known (or expected by some, including 
us) to correlate with relevant genetic variations. But this kind of indirectness 
is not restricted to culture or typical only of it. On the contrary, it is 
probably correct to say that most of  the observable phenotypic variations 
that co-occur locally within species do not correlate with genetic variations; 
this is certainly a correct statement about behavioral variations (as 
compared to morphological and physiological variations) (Lumsden and 
Wilson, 1981, seem to have a different view and may regard genetic 
variation as more frequently underlying observed phenotypic variations 
than we do). In this sense natural selection would not be "directly" responsible 
for "molding" even noncultural influences on the behavior of animals in 
general. Coevolutionists, by their criteria for distinguishing cultural and 
biological evolution, often seem instead to be distinguishing phenotypes 
from genotypes. 
The second effect of natural selection is that it accumulates genes with 
particular consequences in particular environments. Through this second 
effect, which is both poorly understood and neglected by students of human 
behavior, natural selection is responsible for molding both cultural and 
noncultural influences on diversity. The real questions with regard to 
culture theory are the extent to which these cumulative effects of natural 
selection influence rates and directions of cultural change, and how this 
influence is exerted. We regard it as a fact that such influence occurs, not 
only in the appearance, adoption, rejection, disappearance, spread, and 
persistence of cultural traits, but in the same kinds of change in all other 
traits of organisms. Probably all of the biologists discussing culture theory 
agree, but some of their arguments may mislead others into thinking that 
they do not. Some critics of  evolutionary explanations based on biological 
adaptation argue that for any trait to be considered biologically adaptive 
and a product of  selection, it is necessary first to demonstrate that 
variations in that trait with differing reproductive value correlate with 
genetic variations. This is obviously an inappropriate requirement. The 
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effect of natural selection is to do away with such variations in the process 
of molding evolutionary adaptation; such variations should only be 
expected when (1) selection acts differently on different parts of the 
population or (2) the environment has recently changed (Lumsden and 
Wilson, 1981, may have a different view). Phenotypes-and behavior a 
fortiori-are ways of adopting different strategies in different environments 
using the same sets of genes; and phenotypes are products of natural 
selection. Complex alternative phenotypic strategies correlated with genetic 
uniformity are not evidence against the efficacy of selection, but instead are 
evidence of a history of powerful selection involving unpredictability in 
environmental shifts or oscillations, The biological literature is filled with 
examples. 
We cannot overemphasize the importance of this point for 
understanding the influence natural selection has had on the evolution of 
human learning, and consequently on cultural evolution. The ability to 
learn, and directional tendencies in learning of whatever sort, are surely 
products of natural selection. Learning must result from the action of genes 
that specify that the organism should develop in such a fashion as to be able 
to respond adaptively to any situation from some array of likely situations 
when the particular one that will eventuate cannot be identified far ahead of 
time. What has been favored by natural selection in general is the ability to 
respond adaptively to varying environmental conditions. The one-gene-for- 
one-behavior canalization falsely attributed to natural-selection models of 
culture is a product of a narrow and erroneous view of organic evolution. 
The differences among the various biological-evolutionary approaches 
to cultural change thus involve different views of (1) the evolution of 
learning and (2) whether or not the transmission of cultural traits via 
learning decouples culture from biological adaptation. Because Durham's 
paper is a general effort to develop coevolutionary theory, we devote much 
of the remainder of our argument to it. This attention should not be 
construed as criticism in itself, but as an acknowledgment that his 
arguments are the most general, and probably the most widely cited. 
In attempting to deal with proximate mechanisms, Durham, like other 
coevolutionists, distinguishes "genetic transmission" from "cultural 
transmission." This dichotomy, however, is unacceptable because: (1) in 
discussing genetic transmission he includes (solely) phenotypic traits that 
appear not just because genes pass unchanged from generation to 
generation but also because environments are consistent between 
generations; and (2) in discussing cultural transmission he includes (solely) 
traits that appear not just because of environmental influences but also 
because of genetic integrity and a history of natural selection. Durham 
asserts that humans are different from other organisms because "diversity is 
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a product of two sets of instructions of genes and culture." This is a 
common theme (Cloak, 1975; Boyd and Richerson, 1978; Lumsden and 
Wilson, 1981; others). However, two sets of instructions occur in the 
development of all traits of all organisms: genetic and environmental. No 
rationale has ever been advanced for regarding the influence of culture on 
the development and expression of behavior as other than a special subset 
of the environment. The remarkable persistence of such unsupportable 
dichotomies seems to attest primarily to the human reluctance to see 
ourselves as natural objects in the universe, subject, even if in a special way, 
to the same rules that govern all life. 
(Incidentally, but not trivially, Durham's definition of inclusive fitness 
includes the commonly repeated error that it is measured by adding the 
reproductive success of relatives to the reproductive success of the 
individual being considered. As West-Eberhard 0975) clarifies, Hamilton 
(1964) defined and used the term quite differently, adding instead the effect 
o f  the individual's effort on its relatives' reproduction.) 
Durham proposes what he calls constrained microevolution as a 
general framework for cultural analysis; but, as we have already noted, all 
microevolution is always constrained. He argues, "both that the means of 
transmission are distinct from genetics and that the units transmitted are non- 
genetic entities [and] . . . In this way, some aspects of human phenotypes 
may change wholly independently from genetic change." 
These statements illustrate most clearly why we regard the 
coevolutionary approach as confusing. Unless one ignores (1) the history of 
natural selection, i.e., its cumulative effects on the genotype, (2) the 
integrity of genes from generation to generation, and (3) the various kinds 
of learning biases that result from the interaction of the organism's genetic 
materials with the environment during behavioral development," one cannot 
argue that cultural transmission is "distinct from genetics," that "the 
traits transmitted are non-genetic," or that phenotypes change "wholly 
independently of [past] genetic change." 
Durham later argues that in his proposed process of "constrained 
microevolution . . .  both kinds of fitness, genetic fitness and cultural 
fitness, vary as a function of the phenotypes they help to create," If by 
"they" he means "both kinds of fitness," his statement is essentially 
meaningless: fitness cannot help to create phenotypes. Genetic fitness varies 
as a function of the phenotypes the genes help to create, but there is no 
parallel unit or underlying factor in culture that contributes to the 
phenotype. If by "they" he means "each kind of trait, genetic and cultural," 
then he is simply describing the process of organic evolution as it has always 
been known to biologists: selection always acts through phenotypes. 
D u r h a m  defines cultural fitness as an attribute of cultural traits: 
"Instructions that are successfully 'handed down' for long periods of time 
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9 . . can be said to have high cultural fitness." In distinguishing directions of 
evolution of "genetic influence" and "cultural influence" on human 
phenotypes, however, he says that the latter "will similarly evolve in the 
direction of the available character state or states that maximize cultural 
fitness." Defining cultural fitness in terms of traits, and on the basis of their 
persistence, however, causes this statement to become nonsensical. The 
reason for this confusion, again, is that in the one case he speaks of genes 
and in the other case of traits; yet genes contribute to the evolution of both 
cultural and noncultural traits, and it is transmission of noncultural 
phenotypic traits, not genes, that ought to be compared to the transmission 
of cultural traits. Durham apparently uses the terms "cultural influence" as 
the parallel, in the causation of "cultural traits," to the influence of the 
genetic materials in the causation of any phenotypic trait. If this is his 
meaning, then at the very least he has omitted a third influence on the 
phenotype: that of the noncultural environment, which, equally with genes 
and culture, persists unchanged, often across multiple generations. It is a 
main part of our argument that this factor is consistently ignored in the 
dichotomies of the coevolutionary perspective. 
Durham proposes five models of what he calls the "modes of 
interaction between biological and cultural evolution." His first model, 
"cultural mediation," concerns the selective pressures generated by culture 
as a part of the environment (e.g., changes in subsistence base introduce 
new selective pressures). There is little disagreement among current culture 
theorists that such cultural mediation takes place. 
Durham's models of "genetic mediation" and "enhancement" are more 
problematical. In genetic mediation, "genetically inherited features 
[elsewhere called "biologically inherited" and "genetically determined" 
features] of the organisms affect either the ease or the reinforcement with 
which cultural traits are handed down through time" (p. 313). By genetic 
mediation Durham refers to the fact that an organism's genetic makeup will 
affect traits, such as learning biases, that influence cultural transmission. 
However, Durham persists in referring to "genetically determined" and 
"genetically inherited" features of the organism; this is a dichotomy we 
cannot accept. Since the organism's phenotype is the actual mediator, not 
its genes, the dichotomy ought to be between aspects of the phenotype that 
are acquired with cultural influence and aspects that are acquired without 
cultural influence. Durham also says that "genetic . . . determinants of 
cultural fitness are exogenous to the cultural system itself." His dichotomies 
cause him to ignore the fact that the existing cultural system is always a 
product of both cultural and noncultural influences in the past. 
Transmission defined as "cultural" may be seen as a vehicle of "other" 
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means of transmission, or at most as an augmentation of them; it is not a 
substitute for them. 
In Durham's "enhancement," "the fitnesses of alternative cultural 
instructions are governed by the cultural instructions so as to confer highest 
cultural transmissibility on character states of highest genetic fitness." 
"That which is 'good,' 'suitable,' 'appropriate,' etc. must also be adaptive 
even though the connection certainly need not be conscious. In the case of 
enhancement, unlike genetic mediation, the major determinants of cultural 
fitness are endogenous to the culture itself. Cultural transmission is self- 
regulating in this model, but the outcome will resemble or mimic the kind of 
adaptations produced by the natural selection of  genotypes" (p. 314). 
We believe that this distinction between genetic mediation and 
enhancement is also inappropriate. Durham's assertion that the 
transmission of cultural traits based on "cultural criteria (values, ideas, or 
beliefs)" creates a "self-regulating" process begs the issue. How are these 
"cultural criteria" of enhancement (i.e., values, etc.) initially established 
and maintained, independent of  evolved "features of  the organism [that] 
effect either the ease or the reinforcement with which cultural traits are 
handed down through time" (p. 305)? And what are the mechanisms, other 
than such features of  the organism, that cause enhancement to "resemble or 
mimic the kinds of adaptations produced by natural selection"? Durham 
proposes no mechanisms for the selection of cultural criteria in his 
enhancement model (or for his "neutrality" or "opposition" models). 
Previously (Durham, 1979), however, he proposed four mechanisms for a 
process of "cultural selection" that he implied to be "completely distinct 
from the biological processes of inheritance" (1979: 40): (1) the "selective 
retention" of cultural traits resulting from learning biases in individuals that 
enhance their survival and reproduction; (2) the bias of  "satisfaction" 
resulting from "the persistent, genetic selective advantage for a 
neurophysiology that is rewarded with sensory reinforcements and a feeling 
of 'satisfaction' for those acts likely to enhance survival and reproduction 
and those which produced unpleasant, distressing or painful feedback in 
response to potentially dangerous behaviors" (1979: 45; see also Ruyle, 
1977); (3) biases in the structure of the brain and the CNS in general 
resulting from "the organic evolution of that organ" (1979: 45); (4) the 
"circumstantial bias" resulting from individuals with adaptive cultural traits 
producing more offspring, who by acquiring cultural traits via parental 
teaching increase the representation of those cultural traits. 
None of these mechanisms is independent of the cumulative effects of 
natural selection on human learning abilities and propensities. Rather, they 
are all quite likely to be the results of such selection. 
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Individuals accept or reject cultural traits; this is the "cultural 
selection" (e.g., Durham, 1979) or "psychological selection" (e.g., Cloak, 
1975) process that determines the frequencies of cultural traits. Because 
individuals are born into a particular, existing cultural milieu and are short- 
lived, whereas cultural traits often persist and accumulate across 
generations, and because culture seems to be a group phenomenon, some 
culture theorists have concluded that individuals, even collectively, have 
trivial or random effects on the overall process of cultural evolution (e.g., 
White, 1959). Durham's distinction between enhancement and genetic 
mediation (i.e., cultural and noncultural mediation) parallels this 
superorganic perspective. Insofar as it refers to separate mechanisms for 
acquiring cultural traits, his dichotomy seems to us faulty because the 
cultural traits that exist in an individual's environment (including traits such 
as beliefs, ideas, or values that influence the transmission of other traits) are 
the cumulative results of past psychological selection by other individuals, 
always involving both cultural and noncultural mediation. We believe that 
the critical issue before culture theorists is: What are the evolved proximate 
mechanisms upon which adaptive learning is based? 
Our attention, then, is turned to three questions that we believe 
represent the keys to eventual agreement and mutual understanding among 
the diverse culture theories from biology and the social sciences: (1) How 
can we characterize cultural traits so as to reflect their likelihood of being 
accepted or rejected? (2) How do the processes of acceptance or rejection 
take place? (3) How do the processes of acceptance or rejection relate 
to the presence, absence, and persistence of cultural traits, and to the 
overall forms and diversity of culture? The incredible complexity and 
unpredictability of human social environments are such that selection must 
have favored abilities continually to reprogram the mind's analysis of 
cultural traits (i.e., learning). The question, then, is what are the guidelines 
to this reprogramming that have been favored by natural selection? Such 
guidelines are likely to maximize: (1) acquisition of the most adaptive 
cultural traits, (2) abilities to utilize traits in appropriate circumstances, and 
(3) efficiency of data storage and assortment. We hypothesize that such 
effects are realized in human social environments by such shortcuts and cues as: 
1. Imitatingthose who appear successful 
2. Behaving oppositely or differently from those who appear 
unsuccessful (anti-imitation?) 
3. Accepting advice and instruction from those with an interest in 
one's own success. These will include: (a) genetic relatives; (b) investors in 
reciprocity; (c) others who share the same interests (e.g., any group 
member, in some circumstances) 
4. Viewing skeptically advice and instructions given by an individual 
with interests that conflict with one's own in regard to the topic being 
instructed. 
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These simple mechanisms provide many possibilities for explanations 
of cultural phenomena. As a first example, imitation provides a likely basis 
not only for the acquisition of obviously useful behavior but also for the 
appearance and elaboration of fashion and its parallels: to appear like one 
who is successful can itself cause success. Second, all three kinds of social 
learning can lead to mistakes. What parent has not felt obliged to explain 
the long-term or overall disadvantages of the behavior of a rowdy, rude, 
drug-using, lawless, or shiftless individual who has momentarily become a 
hero to an offspring? Third, the interests of relatives or friends are not 
identical with one's own, leading to the probability of misuse of advice and 
instruction. Again, all. parents probably expend some effort teaching their 
children how to know when to accept advice and instruction, and from 
whom to accept it. 
Finally, the four kinds of social learning listed above are so phrased as 
to refer chiefly to success by individuals, as opposed to other individuals 
within the same groups. But the same vehicles will work when and if 
particular interests of individuals become synonymous with those of the 
group (or everyone else within it). In this way the paradox of culture as a 
group phenomenon and adaptiveness in the biological sense is resolved. 
Perhaps cultural evolution has involved much group extinction, not 
through resource depletion, but through intergroup competition 
(Alexander, 1971; Bigelow, 1969; Durham, 1976). In such cases one needs 
only to discover that the individual who survives even though his group 
loses is likely to lose compared to one who invests heavily in the effort to 
keep his group from losing. A very great deal of instruction apparently 
takes place around this issue in most human societies (see, e.g., Chagnon, 
1977; LeVine and Campbell, 1972). 
Chen et  al. (this volume) analyze the similarity of cultural be'iefs among 
nuclear family members and friends. Their study suggests that kinship is an 
important proximate mechanism in cultural transmission. Although it may be 
questionable to assume that when two individuals (e.g., father and son) share a 
cultural belief this implies transmission of that trait from one to the other, such 
studies may provide insights into basic learning patterns. 
Chen et  al. state that "without a parallel study of adopted children, 
even correlations of the type found here do not allow us to determine 
whether the transmission is cultural or genetic (p. 387). This implication of 
an either/or situation is potentially confusing. Chen et  al. seem to be asking 
whether genetic differences between parents and offspring cause correlation 
of cultural beliefs to be absent. The relevant issue, as we see it, is whether 
there is a genetic contribution to tendencies such as learning more from 
individuals who in normal human social environments (i.e., similar to those 
in our evolutionary history) would be close relatives, imitating behaviors 
that appear successful, and so forth. 
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To examine such hypotheses, additional questions need to be asked, 
such as: (a) Where historically new social situations are involved (e.g., the 
entertainment practices of youth in the Chen et al. study) and parents are 
not useful (i.e., adaptive) models, whom do individuals imitate? (b) Do 
individuals adopt or reject the cultural traits of their parents based on their 
perception of whether such traits have been useful and helpful for their 
parents? (c) What are parental, kin group, and peer group responses to the 
adoption of cultural traits (e.g., social pressure to conform to religious 
practices)? Such questions are difficult to answer adequately with survey 
data (cf. Griliches, 1957). 
Pulliam (this volume) also addresses the issue of cultural transmission 
among relatives, hypothesizing that internal and external conflict are 
correlated with marital residence patterns. He starts with the basic 
assumption (examined by Chert et al.) that individuals tend to acquire 
cultural traits from proximally located individuals (household members). 
He further assumes that people who share cultural traits are more amicable 
towards one another. Noting that matrilocal residence brings together 
males (husbands) from different households, he hypothesizes that this 
results in greater internal conflict but less external conflict. In patrilocal 
societies he hypothesizes the opposite situation, less internal conflict but 
greater external conflict. 
An obvious limitation of Pulliam's hypotheses is that many factors 
influence conflict and amicability other than the similarity of cultural traits 
that pertains among household members (e.g., see Paige and Paige, 1981). 
In addition, Pulliam considers only the effects of males; for females, his 
hypothesis predicts the opposite conflict situation. 
More important, in our opinion, is Pulliam's failure to recognize that 
the variables he is dealing with, such as sharing ideas and residing in a 
household, are probably evolved proximate mechanisms for recognition of 
genetic relatives and/or reciprocators. Hence the ultimate reason for 
associations between idea sharing, residence, and conflict is likely to involve 
a history of kin selection and reciprocal altruism. The fact that humans 
(indeed, probably all social organisms) learn who their relatives are from 
cues such as proximity does not mean that such learning tendencies, and 
corresponding nepotistic behavior, are not products of natural selection. 
Boyd and Richerson also propose a mechanism of cultural evolution 
based on the misconception that learning somehow decouples culture from 
biological adaptation. Their model of the group selection of "public goods" 
ignores relevant biological theories such as reciprocal altruism (Trivers, 
1971), and is instead misdirected against the egoistic propositions of 
formalist economics, which are not synonymous with evolutionary theory. 
This error is evidenced by their statement that "sociobiology predicts that 
human behavior is fundamentally egoistic" (p. 335). To the,, contrary, 
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evolutionary theory predicts that sexual organisms such as humans have 
evolved to be fundamentally nepotistically altruistic. 
Boyd and Richerson perceive the need for a group selection theory of 
cultural evolution because of their assumption that "social cooperation 
entails the production of public goods, and . . . in large groups rational, 
selfish individuals will not voluntary cooperate to produce public goods" 
(p. 337). This assumption is thoroughly refuted by Trivers (1971), Alexander 
(1975, 1979a, 1979b), Becker (1976), Durham (1976, 1979), and Irons 
(1979b). 
CONCLUSIONS 
We believe that a useful, complete theory of culture is simpler than the 
dichotomies promoted by the coevolutionary approach suggest. Culture can 
be regarded as an aspect of the environment into which each human is born 
and must succeed or fail, developed gradually by the succession of humans 
who have lived throughout history. We hypothesize that culture results 
from the inclusive-fitness-maximizing efforts of all humans who have lived. 
We think the evidence suggests that cultural traits are, in general, vehicles of 
genic survival, and that the heritability of cultural traits depends on the 
judgments (conscious and unconscious) of individuals with regard to their 
effects on the individual's inclusive fitness. 
The challenge now before students of culture is to understand the 
proximate mechanisms, especially the ontogeny of learning biases, that 
result in the acquisition and transmission of cultural traits. How, for 
example, do we learn what constitutes an appropriate return on a social 
investment in different circumstances; i.e., what causes us to feel rewarded 
by, say, helping offspring who do not help us back, yet consistently to 
begrudge lesser expenditures to most others, or to feel cheated if we are not 
compensated for such expenditures immediately? We suggest that the 
answers to such questions lie in a few basic evolved learning tendencies. 
REFERENCES 
Alexander, R. D. (1971). The search for an evolutionary philosophy of man. Proceedings of 
the Royal Society of Victoria 84:99-120. 
Alexander, R. D. (1975). The search for a general theory of behavior. Behavioral Science 
20: 77-100. 
Alexander, R. D. (1977). Natural selection and the analysis of human sociality. In Goulden, C. 
E. (ed.), Changing Scenes in the Natural Sciences: 1776-1976, Bicentennial 
Symposium Monograph, Philadelphia Academy of Natural Sciences Special 
Publication No. 12, pp. 283-337. 
Alexander, R. D. (1979a). Darwinism and Human Affairs, University of Washington Press, 
Seattle and London. 
398 Flinn and Alexander 
Alexander, R. D. (1979b). Evolution, social behavior, and ethics. In Engelhardt, T. E., 
and Callahan, D. (ed.), The Foundation o f  Ethics and Its Relationship to Science, 
Vol. 4, Hastings Institute, Hastings-on-Hudson, N.Y. 
Alexander, R. D., and Borgia, G. (1978). Group selection, altruism, and the levels of 
organization of life. Annual Review of  Ecology and Systematics 9." 449-474. 
Becker, G. S. (1976). The Economics o f  Human Behavior. Univ. of Chicago Press, Chicago. 
Bigelow, R. S. (1969). The Dawn Warriors: Man's Evolution Toward Peace. Little, Brown, 
Boston. 
Bonner, J. T. (1980). The Evolution of  Culture in Animals. Princeton University Press, 
Princeton. 
Boyd, R., and Richerson, P. J. (1976). A simple dual inheritance model of the conflict 
between social and biological evolution. Zygon 11(3): 254-262. 
Cavalli-Sforza, L. L., and Feldman, M. W. (1981). Cultural Transmission and Evolution: 
A Quantitative Approach; Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J. 
Chagnon, N. A. (1977). Yanomam6: The Fierce People, 2nd ed. Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 
New York. 
Chagnon, N. A. (1979). Is reproductive success equal in egalitarian societies? In Chagnon, 
N. A., and Irons, W. G. (eds.), Evolutionary Biology and Human Social Behavior: An 
Anthropological Perspective, Duxbury Press, North Scituate, Mass. 
Chagnon, N. A. (1981). Terminological kinship, genealogical relatedness and village 
fissioning among the Yanomam6 Indians. In Alexander, R. D., and Tinkle, D. W. 
(eds.), Natural Selection and Social Behavior, Chiron Press, New York and Concord. 
Chen, K-H., Cavalli-Sforza, L. L., and Feldman, M. W. (1982). A study of cultural trans- 
mission in Taiwan, Human Ecology 10: 375-392. 
Cloak, F. T. (1975). Is a cultural ethology possible? Human Ecology 3: 161-182. 
Daly, M., and Wilson, M. (1978). Sex, Evolution, and Behavior. Duxbury Press, North 
Scituate, Mass. 
Daly, M., and Wilson, M. (1981). Abuse and neglect of children in evolutionary perspec- 
tive. In Alexander, R. D., and Tinkle, D. W. (eds.), Natural Selection and Social 
Behavior, Chiron Press, New York and Concord. 
Dawkins, R. (1976). The Selfish Gene. Oxford University Press, New York. 
Dickemann, M: (1979). The reproductive structure of stratified human societies: a prelimin- 
ary model. In Chagnon, N. A., and Irons, W. G. (eds.), Evolutionary Biology and 
Human Social Organization: An Anthropological Perspective, Duxbury Press, North 
Scituate, Mass. 
Dickemann, M. (1981). Paternal confidence and dowry competition: a biocultural analysis 
of purdah. In Alexander, R. D. and Tinkle, D. W. (eds.), Natural Selection and 
Social Behavior, Chiron Press, New York and Concord. 
Durham, W. H. (1976). Resource competition and human aggression, part 1: A review of 
primitive war. Quarterly Review of  Biology 51 : 385-415. 
Durham, W. H. (1979). Toward a coevolutionary theory of human biology and culture. In 
Chagnon, N. A., and Irons, W. G. (eds.), Evolutionary Biology and Human Social 
Behavior: An Anthropological Perspective, Duxbury Press, North Scituate, Mass. 
Durham, W. H. (1982). Interactions of genetic and cultural evolution: Models and examples. 
Human Ecology 10: 299-334. 
Durkheim, E. (1938). The Rules of  the Sociological Method, 7th ed., Free Press, Glencoe, 111. 
Flinn, M. V. (1981). Uterine vs. agnatic kinship variability and associated cousin marriage 
preferences: An evolutionary biological analysis. In Alexander, R. D., and Tinkle, D. 
W. (eds.), Natural Selection and Social Behavior, Chiron Press, New York and 
Concord. 
Gould, S. J., and Lewontin, R. C. (1979). The spandrels of San Marco and the panglossian 
paradigm: A critique of the adaptationist programme. Proceedings of  the Royal Society 
o f  London B 205: 581-593. 
Griliches, Z. (1957). Hybrid corn: An exploration in the economics of technological change. 
Econometrica 25:501-522. 
Hames, R. B. (1979). Relatedness and interaction among the Ye'kwana: A preliminary 
analysis. In Chagnon, N. A., and Irons, W. G. (eds.), Evolutionary ,,Biology and 
Human SocialBehavior, Duxbury Press, North Scituate, Mass. 
Culture Theory 399 
Hamilton, W. D. (1964). The genetical evolution of social behavior, I, II. Journal of  
TheoreticalBiology 7: 1-52. 
Harris, M. (1974). Cows, Pigs, Wars, and Witches: The Riddle of  Culture. Random House, 
New York. 
Irons, W. G. (1979a). Investment and primary social dyads. In Chagnon, N. A., and Irons, 
W. G. (eds.), Evolutionary Biology and Human Social Behavior: An Anthropological 
Perspective, Duxbury Presg, North Scituate, Mass. 
Irons, W. G. (1979b). Cultural and biological success. In Chagnon, N. A., and Irons, W. G. 
(eds.), Evolutionary Biology and Human Social Behavior, Duxbury Press, North 
Scituate, Mass. 
Kroeber, A. L. (1917). The superorganic. American Anthropologist 19: 163-213. 
LeVine, R. A., and Campbell, D. T. (1972). Ethnocentrism: Theories o f  Conflict, Ethnic 
Attitudes, and Group Behavior, John Wiley, New York. 
Levi-Strauss, L. (1949). Les Structures dl~mentaires de la ParentO. Plon, Paris. 
Lewontin, R. C. (1970). The units of selection. Annual Review of  Ecology and Systematics 
1: 1-18. 
Lumsden, C. J., and Wilson, E. O. (1981). Genes, Mind, and Culture. Harvard Univ. Press, 
Cambridge, Mass, and London, England. 
Mundinger, P. L. (1980). Animal cultures and a general theory of cultural evolution. Ethology 
and Sociobiology 1 : 183-223. 
Paige, K. E., and Paige, J. M. (1981). The Politics o f  Reproductive Ritual, Univ. of Calif. 
Press, Berkeley. 
Parsons, T. (1954). Essays in Sociological Theory, Rev. ed. Free Press, Glencoe, i11. 
Pulliam, H. R. (1982). A social learning model of conflict and cooperation in human societies. 
Human Ecology 10:363-374. 
Pulliam, H. R., and Dunford, C. (1980). Programmed to Learn: An Essay on the Evolution 
of  Culture. Columbia University Press, New York. 
Rappaport, R. (1968). Pigs for  the Ancestors: Ritual in the Ecology of  a New Guinea People. 
Yale University Press, New Haven. 
Richerson, P. J., and Boyd, R. (1978). A dual inheritance model of the human evolutionary 
process, I. Basic concepts and a simple model. Journal o f  Social and Biological 
Structures 1 : 127-154. 
Ruyle, E. E. (1973). Genetic and cultural pools: Some suggestions for a unified theory of 
biocultural evolution. Human Ecology 1 (3): 201-215. 
Ruyle, E. E. (1977). Comment on "The adaptive significance of cultural behavior." Human 
Ecology 5(1): 53-55. 
Sahlins, M. D. (1976a). The Use and Abuse of  Biology: An Anthropological Critique of 
Sociobiology. University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor. 
Sahlins, M. D. (1976b). Culture and Practical Reason. University of Chicago Press, Chicago. 
Schneider, D. M. (1972). What is kinship all about? In Reinig, P. (ed.), Kinship Studies in 
the Morgan Centennial Year, Anthropological Society of Washington, D.C. 
Steward, J. H. (1955). Theory of  Culture Change." The Methodology of  Multilinear Evolution. 
University of Illinois Press, Urbana, Ill. 
Symons, D. (1979). The Evolution of  Human Sexuality. Oxford Univ. Press, New York. 
Trivets, R. L. (1971). The evolution of reciprocal altruism. Quarterly Review of  Biology 
46: 35-57. 
Vayda, A. P. (1969). Expansion and warfare among swidden agriculturalists. In Vayda, A. P. 
(ed.), Environment and Cultural Behavior, l)oubleday, Garden City. 
West-Eberhard, M. J. (1975). The evolution of social behavior by kin selection. Quarterly 
Review of  Biology 50(1): 1-53. 
White, L. A. (1949). The Science of  Culture: A Study of  Man and Civilization. Farrar, 
Straus & Giroux, New York (Reprinted in (1969). 
White, L. A. (1959). The Evolution of  Culture: The Development of  Civilization to the Fall 
of  Rome. McGraw-Hill, New York. 
Williams, G. C. (1966). Adaptation and Natural Selection. Princeton University Press, 
Princeton. 
400 Flinn and Alexander 
Winterhalder, B. P., and Smith, E. A. (eds.), (1981). Hunter-Gatherer Foraging Strategies: 
Ethnographic and Archaeological Analyses. University of Chicago Press, Chicago 
(forthcoming). 
Wynne-Edwards, V. C. (1962). Animal Dispersion in Relation to Social Behavior. 
Oliver & Boyd, Edinburgh. 
